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Preparing for the New Minorities in Europe:  
The EU Influence on National Minority Protection  






In a speech delivered ten days before the Copenhagen European Council summit in 
December 2002, Günther Verheugen, the EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement 
praised the Central and Eastern European candidate countries for their successful 
transformation. The Commissioner stated: 
 
We see clearly success-stories as regards the system transformation. The 
Central and Eastern European candidate countries transformed themselves 
into stable democracies and market economies that are growing even 
faster than the average of the present EU. They were able to set new rules 
and new legislation based on EU law and learned to implement it properly. 
Human rights were respected and minorities protected. Nothing within 
this process is self-evident but is a fantastic result of a human driving-
force for reform, mainly driven forward by the enlargement perspective 
(emphasis added, Verheugen 2002). 
 
The Commissioner’s affirmation of the progress in minority rights protection and 
assertion that this progress is a direct result of these countries’ aspirations to join the EU 
illustrate a popular perception, both within the candidate countries and among outside 
observers, that the drive towards Europe has had a profound impact on domestic 
developments in these countries. In view of the ethnic conflicts that plagued some of 
these countries in the 1990s, the enlargement impact on majority-minority relations and 
minority rights developments is particularly important.  While the question why has the 
EU played such an important role in the candidate countries is very important, the focus 
of this paper is EU involvement in such a sensitive area like minority rights. 
 
This paper examines the mechanisms and strategies of the EU in supporting the 
process of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe by concentrating on one 
particular area which seemed most significant in view of the escalation of ethnic conflict 
in the region. I focus on the influence of the EU’s representatives and institutions in 
inducing cooperation between states and ethnic groups within states for the purpose of 
minority rights expansion and implementation by means of the promise of integration.  
By definition, democratization includes "... the processes whereby the rules and 
procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed 
by other principles... or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights 
and obligations (e.g. ethnic minorities, women, foreign residents, etc.) or extended to 
cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (state agencies, 
military establishments, etc.)" (Schmitter and O'Donnell, 1986: 8).  As early as 1993, the 
European Council had devised specific criteria for the evaluation of a country’s   2
preparedness to gain membership in the Union, and on par with the economic 
requirements were political conditions which outlined the road towards integration.  The 
political conditionality for the Central and Eastern European countries’ membership was 
spelled out in the concluding document of the Copenhagen summit on 21-22 June 1993, 
where the European Council put forward what came to be known as the “Copenhagen 
criteria” for EU admission: “Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union.”
1  While minority rights were never specifically 
listed or clearly outlined, I will demonstrate that through the statements of its 
representatives and the official reports European institutions have issued on the countries’ 
progress towards accession, the EU has continuously had an essential role in the 
expansion of minority rights. 
 
The discussion of the EU’s impact on minority policies starts with a brief 
overview of relevant literature that explains the possible effects of Europeanization.  It 
then proceeds with a short discussion on the contentious minority issues in Romania and 
Slovakia, two countries with significant Hungarian minorities, in the period between the 
fall of communism and 2004.  Although these two countries share a similarity of sizeable 
Hungarian minorities, they are different in both minority policies that were adopted and, 
maybe more importantly, in the fact that Slovakia became a member of the EU in 2004.  
The main part of this article focuses on the role of the European enlargement strategy in 
the adoption of laws that favor minority rights, with an emphasis on laws in the areas of 
education, local government and language rights.  The focus on these particular areas is 
warranted by the fact that they are the ones most contested both by minorities and by 
nationalistic majorities. 
 
An analysis of official documents and statements by political leaders prior to and 
following the adoption of laws in these areas, with particular references to the accession 
strategy, demonstrates the European influences.  In some cases the European strategy is 
genuinely considered to require reform in minority policies, but in others it is mostly used 
to conceal or justify contested acts of governance.  In any case, the European accession 
strategy plays a role which I will demonstrate by analyzing relevant developments in 
Romania and Slovakia. Romania applied for EU membership on June 22, 1995, only the 
third country among the Central and Eastern European countries, after Poland and 
Hungary.  Slovakia submitted its application on June 27, 1995.  In October 1999 the 
European Commission recommended that negotiations for their accessions start.   
Negotiations proceeded differently in the two countries and ultimately Slovakia was put 
on the fast-track and admitted in 2004, while Romania’s accession was delayed at least 
until 2007.  
 
Finally, I conclude with a brief summary of the implications the accession of 
ethnically heterogeneous states has for other candidate members from the same region or 
for the EU itself.  The EU committed to further enlargement to incorporate the Western 
                                                           
1 Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf   3
Balkans in 1999 and since all of these countries have significant minority groups, the 
EU’s strategies used until now, successful or unsuccessful, will be the departing points 
for responses to minority threats in the regions.  Secondly, EU’s enlargement to 
incorporate new Central and Eastern European members has presented the problem of 
lack of uniform policies towards national minorities.  Therefore, it can be expected that 
the Union will gradually move towards a more consistent approach towards minority 
issues. 
 
Europeanization and Domestic Change in Candidate Members 
 
The concept Europeanization is primarily used to denote institutional and policy changes 
within the EU (Fetherstone and Radaelli 2003; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001). But, 
as some academics have already observed, Europeanisation has increasingly become an 
‘essentially contested’ concept (Kassim, 2000, p. 235).  Two divergent definitions stand 
out. 
First, Europeanisation is defined as the emergence and strengthening of 
institutions of governance at the European level. For example, Cowles, Caporaso and 
Risse see it as “the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with 
political problem-solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy 
networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules  (2001: 3).  Second, 
Europeanization is employed to refer to examples where distinct European forms of 
organization and governance have been exported outside Europe’s territorial 
boundaries. It is understood as an ”incremental process re-orienting the direction and 
shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of 
the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994: 69; See 
also Buller and Gamble 2002: 17; Radaelli 2000). In that definition, Europeanization is 
seen as a policy transfer or “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of 
policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place” 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.344). 
 
When discussing Europeanization, most authors focus exclusively on its 
national or supranational character within the EU and its member states.  As Knill and 
Lehmkuhl observe, “Member states have to bring domestic arrangements into line with a 
‘European model’ which is implicit in the supra-national policy decision” (1999:3).  Thus 
Europeanization encompasses the processes of interpenetration between the supranational 
and the domestic level (Radaelli 2000). Notwithstanding the danger of conceptual 
stretching, I argue that Europeanization can and should be applied to explain the adoption 
of policies in candidate members.  The definition of Europeanization that would be most 
useful as a starting point for studying the European effects on the candidate countries is 
one articulated by Hix and Goetz, who define it as “a process of change in national 
institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration” (2000: 
27).  This definition is broad enough to allow for the inclusion of other variables that 
could explain outcomes from the Europeanization process in conjunction with the 
demands of European integration.  The importance attributed to European integration by   4
candidate members does not necessarily entail an unimpeded process of absorption of 
European norms.   The "goodness of fit” measure for Europeanization holds true for 
candidate countries as much as for EU members (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001). 
“Goodness of fit” refers to the degree of pressure for domestic adjustment as a result of 
institutional and policy (in)compatibility between the European and the domestic level 
(6-7).  But while the outcome of Europeanization within the Union may be convergence 
or divergence, the candidate states have a much narrower flexibility for action.   
Divergence from European norms is not an option if the integration process is to lead to 
accession.   
 
In the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe the shift of loyalties and 
activities towards Europe had started before their actual admission to the Union.  Through 
the principle of conditionality and the commitment of the candidate members to reforms as 
a prerequisite for their accession, these countries had already started their integration.  The 
candidate members had already shifted their activities in their drive to fulfil EU 
requirements for accession by submitting their actions and policies for reviews and 
recommendations from the European institutions. Since the candidate members can 
exercise little, if any, influence over developments within the Union, a top-bottom 
approach would be more suitable in explaining the measures taken by these countries to 
comply with European standards.  The argument can be made that when looking at 
Europeanization as a process within the Union, it is subject to interpenetration from the 
supranational and the domestic level, whereas the Europeanization of the candidate 
countries involves their adoption of the acquis communautaire “as is,” without them being 
able to exercise control over it.  Considering the existing asymmetrical power relationship 
in which the EU prescribes while candidates adopt and implement, the concept of 
conditionality would be particularly useful in explaining the mechanisms through which the 
EU shapes domestic policies in the candidate members.  
 
Conditionality is traditionally used when referring to the “carrot and stick” 
strategy of the International Monetary Fund in exacting often times painful economic 
change in impoverished Third World countries.  Yet, even though discussions of the 
“European enlargement” or “Europeanization” are often narrowed down to economical or 
institutional questions, scholars widely agree that political conditionality is also very 
important for Central and Eastern Europe. While conditionality in the economic arena 
relies on specific measures of success and failure, political conditionality that speaks 
broadly of the rule of law and regards to minority rights is much more subtle.   
Conditionality is defined as “a basic strategy through which international institutions 
promote compliance by national governments” (Checkel 2000: 1). It is “the idea to use the 
fulfilment of stipulated political obligations as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid, 
debt relief, most-favored-nation treatment, access to subsidized credit, or membership in 
coveted regional or global organizations” (Schmitter 1996: 42).  In this view, conditionality 
requires the articulation of a set of agreed upon desirable practices and mandatory, or at 
least recommended, objectives.  But herein lies the problem – the EU lacks a precise and 
unanimous understanding of what minority rights include. Then, can we talk about EU 
imposed conditionality on Central and Eastern Europe with regards to minority rights?   If   5
Europeanization is a policy transfer, what are those policies related to minority rights that 
the candidate countries should endorse and apply?  
 
These important questions suggest the need for qualifications with regards to 
political conditionality concerning minority rights.  First, the lack of specific EU 
regulations and policies directly referring to minorities is indicative of the lack of 
consensus among EU members as to what minority rights are and how they should be 
protected.  Minority rights protection has remained the domain of national policies rather 
than supranational ones.  Consequently, EU requirements for minority respect and 
protection towards the candidate countries, are predictably less direct that economic and 
institutional prerequisites.  As a result, EU demands for minority protection in Central 
and Eastern Europe did not include specific models for improvement, but developed over 
time and were influenced by developments external to the EU.  Some of these 
developments were even external to the candidate countries which the EU was targeting 
for reforms.  The unraveling of Yugoslavia, with protracted violent conflicts in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, had a significant impact on the visions of 
European elites for the development of the region.  The strength of both majority and 
minority nationalism in Europe’s own backyard caught the EU member states unprepared 
to cope with.  But a slow process of political learning occurred over time.  This leads to 
the second important qualification when applying political conditionality to explain 
minority policies in the candidate countries. The vagueness of the initial requirements for 
minority protection allowed the EU to formulate and re-formulate its recommendations. 
The initial hesitance and confusion as to what Europe can do to alleviate ethnic strife was 
gradually replaced by a more confident approach of steering the candidate countries’ 
nationalistic majorities on the sidelines and towards measures that would induce 
cooperation.  These measures varied from country to country, depending on the country’s 
internal conditions.   
 
The Central and Eastern European countries have a set of “confining 
conditions” which entail the different pace and outlook of Europeanization.  In the 
region, Europeanization became closely linked and synonymous to democratization.  The 
“return to Europe” was tantamount to the adoption of democratic norms espoused in 
Western Europe but in a very different context.  Admitting that each state has its own 
peculiarities, Demetropoulou presents a set of “common confining conditions” for the 
new candidates, and argues that these “need to be addressed for the Europeanization of 
the Balkans to be facilitated (2002: 90).  Together with the political, economic and social 
conditions, she lists “state-building” which includes unsettled borders, relations of 
political centre with minorities, and close interrelationship of minority problems.
2  There 
is little doubt now, with the hindsight of European intervention in the Balkan wars, that 
the EU was ill-equipped to cope with the security issues that arose as communism 
crumbled.  As a result, European involvement in promoting stability and encouraging 
ethnic cooperation in countries was on an ad hoc basis, shaped by internal as well as 
external developments.  
                                                           
2 The author does not elaborate on the “close interrelationship of minority problems” factor and it is 
unclear whether she means it to apply for domestic politics or cross-border.   6
This variation was and continues to be an important and necessary ingredient 
for the EU strategy for minority protection since the EU balances between a formal 
recognition for collective minority rights and the need to minimize security threats on the 
borders of the Union or between its members.  This balancing act has resulted in the 
Union’s closer scrutiny or screening of majority-minority relations, and the adjustment of 
its advice and involvement in the domestic affairs of candidates.  Quite surprisingly, the 
process of reception and projection that according to some occurs within the Union 
(Bulmer and Burch 2000: 47-48), is also taking place with regards to European views of 
minority rights, at least as proclaimed towards candidate countries.  There is also 
evidence suggesting that the EU itself is changing with regards to minority rights.  The 
specific reference to minority rights in the European Constitution signed by the Heads of 
State and Government of the EU members and the three candidate members at the time – 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – is indicative of this change.  Article I-2 states, “The 
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.”  There is no earlier reference to minority rights in official 
European documents except for the concluding document of the Copenhagen summit on 
21-22 June 1993, and it is important to note that the document was aimed at influencing 
the conflict ridden Central and Eastern European countries.   
 
In view of the existing vagueness within the EU regarding minority rights, there 
is one factor that was of utmost importance for positive developments in minority 
policies. The actions and demands of minority groups have played a significant role in 
helping EU institutions to frame and articulate recommendations or provide assistance for 
improving minorities’ status within states.  In many cases, the EU has played a reactive, 
rather than proactive role in encouraging majority-minority cooperation. For example, in 
March 2001, amidst fighting between Macedonian security forces and Albanian rebels in 
Macedonia, the Macedonian government was bombarded with pledges by EU officials 
for financial support and technical assistance in minority-related issues, like the funding 
of Albanian-language university, assistance for a new census (previous census results 
were contested by Albanians), and development of infrastructure projects in the Western, 
Albanian-populated regions of the country (Lungescu 2001).  
 
The issue of Albanian-language University had been raised continuously by 
Albanians for the past decade but it was only after violence erupted that the European 
Union intervened decisively in favor of the demand.  In Romania, reviewing the 
Education Law originally adopted in 1995, the European Commission stated that it is “a 
progressive law in line with EU standards,” but at the same time commended the 
amendments introduced to the law in 1997 which expanded minority rights (Commission 
Annual Report 1997).  In contrast, in Bulgaria, demands for higher education in the 
mother tongue of the Turkish minority were never expressed by the ethnic political party, 
and the issue was never put on the political agenda.  As a result European representatives 
and institutions never advanced a recommendation for the introduction of higher 
education in minority language but commended the availability of primary and secondary 
education in Turkish (Commission Opinion on Bulgaria’s Application for Membership of 
the EU, DOC/97/11).  These are only a few examples of the European influence and   7
responses to minority demands.  The next section will focus with more detail on the 
mechanisms the EU used to encourage cooperation and alleviate tensions between 
majority and minority groups in Romania and Slovakia.  Through the examples of ethnic 
accommodation or conflict in these countries I will demonstrate the remarkable nature of 
EU involvement in minority-related problems. 
 
EU’s Involvement in Majority-Minority Relations in Romania and Slovakia: 
Ambiguity, Caution, Pragmatism 
 
The EU influences minority policy in the candidate countries through two approaches.  
First, the EU encourages positive change with regards to minority rights by the very 
promise of European integration.  By endorsing minority rights protection in 1993, 
however ambiguously, the EU has made it one of the conditions for the candidate 
members’ integration.  Exclusion from the EU was never a popular platform for 
politicians in the candidate members even before the EU committed to enlargement. In 
the period between the fall of communism and 1995, however, there was not a formal, 
unanimous decision at the EU level regarding the new Eastern “democracies.”  Therefore, 
in that period, it was mostly indirectly that the European dream influenced the decisions 
of Eastern European elites.  That indirect approach allowed undemocratic, corrupt and 
nationalistic elite to capture the early years of the transition in some countries.  In 
Slovakia, the nationalistic Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, endorsed European 
integration in official statements but did little to introduce or speed up reforms required 
for it.  It was Meciar’s government that submitted a membership application to the EU, 
but his “European” drive was marred by political corruption and endemic nationalism 
aimed against minorities.  The EU could do little to change Meciar’s policies. It should 
be noted that Slovakia became an independent state only in 1993, and its homogeneous 
character, with almost 10% of the population being Hungarian, provided populist leaders 
with ample ground for exploiting societal differences and the “Hungarian threat.”  In that 
regard Slovakia is in no way unique. Croatia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania experience 
a similar transition period characterized by the exacerbation of ethnic tensions.  And in 
all of them European integration was pushed on the sidelines of the political agenda, 
despite declarations to the contrary. 
 
The second approach was adopted by the EU mostly after 1995 in response to the 
formal applications for membership being submitted by new candidates.  Apart from the 
official reports published by the Commission periodically, the EU also used demarches to 
show its opinion on reforms in the candidate countries.  In November 1994 and October 
1995 the EU issued demarches to Slovakia (RFE/RL 1996), criticizing the excessively 
antagonistic relations between the ruling coalition and the opposition, the purges in the 
state administration and the insufficient respect shown for the principles of democracy 
and human rights (Slivkova 1999). In addition, to the Commission’s opinions, the 
European Parliament also issued statements concerning developments in Slovakia, mostly 
about what the parliamentarians considered negative developments.  It is interesting to 
note that in those official opinions and statements the European institutions held the 
candidate countries responsible to higher standards by encouraging them to adopt 
international documents like the Framework Convention for the Protection of National   8
Minorities.  The Commission also consults the High Commissioner for National 
Minorities (HCNM) of the Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), and incorporates his recommendations in its opinions.  Some scholars even 
claim that the EU has “in effect delegated to the HCNM the task of judging whether 
countries have ‘done enough’ in terms of minority rights” (Kymlicka 2001: 375).  
 
The effect of the EU’s official positions should not be sought only in the 
legislation and policies the candidates adopted after those opinions.  As the analysis 
below demonstrates, the political elites in Romania and Slovakia acted strategically, 
adopting very controversial legislative acts a short period of time before the 
Commission’s report.  In many cases the timing of minority related legislation is one of 
the main manifestations of the EU’s influence.  I will demonstrate this point by 
presenting consecutively minority-related legislation developed in Romania and Slovakia 
in the areas of education, language use and decentralization. 
 
EU and Romania 
 
The period between 1990 and 1996 in Romania is characterized by the strength of 
Romanian nationalism and the adoption of laws that, according to the Hungarian 
minority, were restrictive of their rights. The first important legislation was the Law on 
Local Public Administration adopted in 1991. According to the Law, local council 
decision could be published in Romanian and in the language of minorities which were of 
“significant numerical importance,” but Romanian would be the official language of 
council meetings.  The most contested part of the law was its provision that in settlements 
where a minority group was no less than 30% of the population, the language of that 
minority group could be used in official matters with the local administration.  Formal 
requests, however, had to be accompanied by an official translation.  According to 
Hungarians, the 30% requirement was too high. DAHR also contested the paragraph of 
the Law, which says that the prefects, among other things, will promote "the national 
interest," believing that they should, in accordance with Article 122 of the Constitution, 
represent and defend the local interests ("Romania Update," East European 
Constitutional Review, 1996). 
 
The second important legislation, the law on education was adopted in June 1995 
despite Hungarian protests.  According to article 124 of the Law, university entrance 
examinations have to be taken in Romanian, except for subjects in which university 
instruction in the mother tongue is provided, such as teacher training and the arts.  In 
addition, Article 123 stipulates that at the secondary level of education the language of 
instruction in the subjects of “history of Romania” and “geography of Romania” was to 
be Romanian.   
 
Unlike the law on public administration, the education law produced a fast 
response from the Union.  The reason for that is that in April 1995, Romania had signed 
the “Stability Pact for Europe” in which it committed to minority protection.  The EU 
now had specific clauses to which it could refer in evaluating reforms in Romania and as 
a result in July 1995, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the law,   9
which “led to a further deterioration of the situation of minorities in Romania.” The 
resolution also stated that the law “arbitrarily restricts the educational rights of 
minorities” and urged the Romanian legislature to repeal it, otherwise it may be 
disqualified from joining the EU.
3 Bela Marko, the chairperson of the Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, welcomed the resolution (Shafir 1995). He claimed 
that the law was “in complete disregard of the national minorities’ interests” and asserted 
that “the law is not only discriminative as regard to the native language education of 
minorities, but even more restrictive – in this respect – than the law in force under 
Ceausescu” (qtd. in Horvath 2002: 93).  
 
Under a new government, Romania renewed its attempts to alleviate ethnic 
tensions regarding minority education and language use. As regional specialists noted, 
“membership incentives contributed to positive changes in Romania after the change of 
government” (Kelley 2001: 21). This goal was strengthened as July 15, 1997 approached.  
On this date, the European Commission was to issue its “Opinion” on the eligibility of 
each associated country for the start of accession negotiations.  Romania was determined 
to be a part of this group, if only for fear of being left out of a first enlargement when 
there might not be a second one.  December 12-13, 1997 was a similarly important 
deadline, when the EU Heads of State would support or reject the Commission’s 
Opinions.   
 
Government emergency decree 36/1997 adopted on July 10, 1997 did remove the 
anti-minority provisions of the education law but its approval by the legislature was 
protracted for two years. Another emergency decree, 22/1997, modified the public 
administration law, stipulating in Articles 23-25 and 58 that authorities are obliged to 
make their decisions public in the language of a given minority if that minority represents 
at least 20% of the population in the municipality. In case of such population 
composition, the Hungarians also had the right to address the authorities in their 
language. In municipalities where the minority councilors are al least one third, council 
meetings could be conducted in the language of the minority. However, the 
implementation of the government decree was hindered since for a long time Parliament 
did not elevate it to the status of a law. The Constitutional Court held that the ordinance’s 
subject matter should have been regulated by means of ordinary legislation, otherwise it 
could not be implements. A few days later the European Commission's Opinion of July 
16 recognized that Romania had “worked hard to regularize relations with its neighbors, 
concluding agreements with Hungary and Ukraine on recognition of borders and minority 
rights.”  The Commission noted that Romania had signed the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities and had established a national council for minority 
issues.  The Commission also emphasized the ordinances mentioned above as 
improvements of minority rights.
4  However, the Commission did not recommend the 
                                                           
3 European Parliament, Resolution on the protection of minority rights and human rights in Romania – B4-1025/95, 
July 13, 1995. Full text available at 
http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar?APP=PV2&LANGUE=EN  
 
4 European Commission, “Agenda 2000: Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership 
of the European Union,” Brussels, 15 July 1997, DOC/97/18, p. 7.  10
start of negotiations with Romania. With the prospect of participating in the first 
enlargement wave vanished, on December 9, 1997, the Senate rejected an appeal from the 
president and adopted amendments to the education law, which are much more restrictive 
for minorities than the emergency decree (Romania Update 1997).  Yet, the Commission, 
despite its earlier approval of the emergency ordinances, did not take into account the 
Hungarian objections to the laws that were subsequently adopted and focused instead on 
the conditions of the Roma minority (Regular Report of the Commission on Romania, 
1998). 
Finally, in 2001 a new law on public administration was adopted (Law 215/2002) 
with the provision for the use of minority languages in administrative units where a 
minority represents at least 20% of the population.  DAHR’s President described the law 
as being the most important triumph for ethnic minorities in Romania in the past 10 years 
along with the educational law amended in 1999 (Hungarian Human Rights Monitor, 
January 2001). The European Commissioner for Enlargement praised Romania for 
improving its treatment of ethnic minorities” (Tomiuc 2001: 2). In addition, DAHR also 
succeeded in achieving another of its major goals.  In October 2001 was the formal 
opening of a Hungarian-language university that DAHR had pushed for since its 
establishment.  The university was private and therefore not state-funded but its 
legalization was a considerable success. 
 
EU and Slovakia 
 
In Slovakia developments regarding minority-related legislation followed a similar path.  
The new legislature created after the November 1994 elections adopted a new law on the 
State Language which centralized control over education by allowing the Education 
minister to dismiss principals who were deemed incapable. The new Education minister 
announced that “incapability” involved lack of fluency in Slovak and advocated that 
language, literature, history, geography etc. “be taught only by ethnic Slovak teachers” 
(Ishiyama and Breuning 1998; See also Dostal 1998). In addition, the law stipulated that 
“proof of proficiency in speaking and writing the state language is a condition of 
employment or engagement in other work-like situations, and is a prerequisite to 
completing contractual work for public bodies” (Article 1, Paragraph 3).  Following the 
implementation of the law, one Hungarian leader claimed that the law was used to 
remove ethnic Hungarians from official positions. The law was bashed both by the 
Hungarian minority and the European Parliament because it was not explicit on the use of 
minority languages.
5   
 
The actions of the Parliament and the Commission were somewhat contradictory 
in the following years. In its 1997 report the Commission asserted that minority rights 
have been recognized in Slovakia but it also pointed to the “instability of institutions and 
their lack of rootedness in political life.” In 1998 the European Parliament requested “the 
Slovak Republic to give absolute priority to… human rights and the rights of minorities, 
democracy and the rule of law.”
6  Recommendations towards Slovakia poured from all 
                                                           
5 European Parliament resolution on the political situation in Slovakia, 9(e) B4-0849/97 
 
6 European Parliament resolution on the Slovak Republic, O.J. C 328, 26/10/1998, p. 190.  11
EU institutions.  First the Commission and then the Council agreed that minority-
language use specifically, and the developments of policies and institutions protection the 
rights of minorities were a priority.
7 The treatment of the Hungarian minority was 
removed as an area for improvement from the Commission’s 1999 report. 
 
In 1999 the Slovak legislature approved a Language Law establishing a 20% 
threshold for the use of minority languages in an administrative region.
8  Hungarians 
were not fully satisfied but the amendments they proposed were rejected. Some observers 
noted that “the bill had to be rushed through Parliament in a shortened parliamentary 
session because of an impending meeting of European Commission officials, at which 
they will decide on the countries to be included in first-round EU entry talks at the 
Helsinki summit scheduled for December” (Kopanic 1999). After 1999 the Commission 
referred to need for improvement of minority rights only in reference to the Roma 
minority. However, Slovakia continued introducing reforms that were in the interest of 
the Hungarian minorities. In June 2001 Slovakia ratified the European Charter on 
Regional and Minority Languages and the Commission commended it in its 2001 Report.  
In addition, administrative reform establishing self-government and decentralization of 
power was introduced in 2001. 
 
Decentralization in Romania and Slovakia 
 
Decentralization is seen by the Hungarian minorities as a way for them to expand their 
rights.  Since Hungarians are concentrated in specific regions they would benefit from the 
devolution of power to local governments which they consider as close as they could get 
to territorial autonomy.  Fortunately for them, decentralization and devolution of power 
are goals endorsed by the EU.  For that reason through its reports the Commission 
actively promoted decentralization but without a specific reference to it as a goal that 
would improve inter-ethnic relations.   
 
Decentralization in Romania has started progressing at a fast pace since 1998 
when two important laws regulating local financing were adopted (189 and 213), 
following the Law on Regional Development, which divided the country in eight 
development regions. Law 189/1998 aimed to decrease the dependency of local budgets 
on state budgets, and to establish stable resources for local administrative units. 
Earmarked subsidies and transfers have been replaced by revenue sharing of a national 
tax with the revenues allotted directly to local budgets.  Instead of all the revenues being 
transferred to the central budget with the government being responsible for allocating 
funds to each local administration, local governments started receiving a percentage of 
the income tax at the moment they were collected. The Law on Public Finance had a 
positive effect on decentralization by giving more financial responsibility to local 
administrations. Between 1991 and 1998, more than 70% of local revenues came from 
                                                           
7 Council Decision 98/262/EC of March 1998 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives 
and conditions contained in the accession partnership with the Slovak Republic, O.J. L121, 23/04/1998, pp. 
16-20. 
 
8 Law on the Use of Minority Languages, July 11, 1999 
http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Slovakia/Slovakia_MinorLang_English.htm  12
the state budget, while for 1998 and 1999, the same dropped to less than 30% (Romanik 
and Conway, 2002).  Yet, in 2004 the DAHR leader urged for further decentralization 
which would help the Hungarian minority in Romania achieve the administrative 
autonomy it seeks (Divers, August 30, 2004). 
 
In Slovakia public administration reform was also continuously debated, 
especially after 1998 when the Hungarian coalition participated in the government. 
However, even in 1996, Hungarians in Slovakia were expressing demands for “self 
administration.”  Gyla Bardos, a member of the legislature from the Hungarian Christian 
Democratic Movement, explained that “autonomy, or self administration, is a legal 
framework enabling a citizen, or several citizens to decide about their own matters. It has 
nothing to do with national minorities” (in The Slovak Spectator, July 31, 1996).  Bardos 
put the idea in terms that liberal democratic politicians would find hard to disagree with.  
Yet, the regional structure of the country created in 1996 was designed so that none of the 
eight regions that were created had any considerable share of Hungarians. In 2000, the 
Hungarian leader Bela Bugar announced his plan for redrawing the country so that 
Komarno County, where the majority of Hungarians live, would be a separate 
development region and therefore a direct recipient of EU funds (The Slovak Spectator, 
September 18, 2000).  The cabinet approved the proposal but the law that came out of the 
legislature was against the wishes of the Hungarians. The law on regional administration 
approved by the legislature on July 4, 2001, divided the country once again in eight 
regions, in none of which Hungarians had a majority.  In its Annual report the 
Commission did not take a stance on Hungarian demands and commended the new law 
urging that “the reform is implemented without delay, ensuring the functioning of a 
democratic, efficient and sustainable self-administration” (Commission Report on 
Romania 2001: 16). 
 
In its reports on progress in Romania and Slovakia the Commission has 
understandably taken a minority-neutral stand regarding regional development.  The 
principles of regionality and subsidiarity according to which decisions should be made at 
the level closest to the citizens of the Union do not contain any direct reference to 
minority rights. In 1994 the Committee of the Regions was established in the EU as “the 
political assembly which provides local and regional authorities with a voice at the heart 
of the European Union.”
9 According to Article 3b of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, “In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community.” The local administration reforms in Romania and Slovakia 
are driven by the need to harmonize their policies with the principles of regionality and 
subsidiarity on one hand, and on the other, reform is required by the EU in order those 
regions to qualify for financial and technical assistance from the Union’s structural and 
cohesion funds. According to the last report of the Commission on Slovakia in 2003, the 
divisions of responsibility between the central and local authorities was still 
                                                           
9 “The Committee of the Regions: An Introduction.” 
http://www.cor.eu.int/en/presentation/Role.htm  13
underspecified and there was lack of coordination between the central level and the 
regions. The 2004 report on Romania was critical of the local authorities’ administrative 
capacity.  Nothing was mentioned on Hungarian demands for further decentralization. 
 
EU and the New Minorities 
 
The issue of minority rights protection continues to be an important one for future 
developments in the Union considering its continued enlargement to include ethnically 
homogeneous states.  The protection and participation of minorities is implicitly 
incorporated through the notion of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, the European 
Council of Copenhagen and the Stability Pact for Europe.  However, the Union still shies 
away from endorsing minority rights as “collective rights.”  The “Balladur” plan, named 
after French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, proposed in April 1993, explicitly referred 
to the possibility of `minor border modifications' and `collective minority rights' (Dunay 
1995). However, the Copenhagen criteria endorsed by the EU a few months later only 
called for “respect for and protection of minorities.” This specific reference to minority 
rights, in conjunction with broader human rights is an important recognition.    
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights was another opportunity to incorporate 
minority protection explicitly into EU legislation. However, in the Charter adopted at 
Nice in December 2000, relevant provisions were limited to a prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 21) and to the following brief provision: "The Union shall respect 
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity" (Art.22). Once again, there was no explicit 
mention of "minorities". There was no subsequent reference to minority rights neither in 
the Amsterdam Treaty, nor in the Nice Treaty, but the more recent signing of the 
Constitution for Europe, indicates that protection of minority rights is still part of the 
EU’s future strategy.  As Kymlicka argues, “Western countries have moved along two 
different and somewhat contradictory tracks.  On the one hand, they have maintained but 
weakened the commitment to a universal, justice-based, minority rights track; on the 
other hand, they have created a new contextual, security-based minority rights track” 
(2001: 372).   
 
As the EU continues to expand, the presence of a group of countries with national 
minorities which continue to demand greater autonomy is likely to change the approach 
of the Union towards minority rights. And with the institutional and decision-making 
changes taking place, countries like France and Belgium who were unwilling to commit 
to the extensive minority protection of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, may have to acquiesce to the decisions taken by 
a majority. Launching this paper with a statement of the EU’s Enlargement 
Commissioner specifically referring to minority rights, it seems fitting to finish it with a 
statement by the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities.  After all, looking 
at the ambiguous stance of the European Union, often times with only lip-service being 
paid to the idea of protecting national minorities, the OSCE’s Commissioner seems to be 
the one most fervently pursuing what the Union preached.  In a 2002 speech in 
Copenhagen, Rolf Ekeus stated unequivocally: 
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…standards on which the Copenhagen criteria are based should be 
universally applicable within and throughout the EU, in which case they 
should be equally – and consistently – applied to all Member States.   
Otherwise, the relationships between the existing and aspiring EU 
Member States would be unbalanced in terms of applicable standards 
(2002: 4). 
 
Can the EU move towards a more integrated and consistent minority policy?   
With countries like Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and a number of other states 
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